The Ukraine war is the latest in a long series of bloody and expensive American crusades allegedly fought to make “the world safe for democracy.” But beneath the current carefully crafted US government and media illusion of absolute right and wrong lies a more subtle and dangerous truth.
The US government and its NATO allies have promoted a simple-minded narrative that ignores the contributing role our blundering and bad faith have played in the long lead-up to the war. The consequences of our ineptitude have the potential to end in nuclear war experts have dreaded since 1949.
Promises
In 1990 the Soviet Union was dissolving before our very eyes. Russia was a nuclear superpower, and pushing it too aggressively was risky. President George Bush (senior) and his advisors wanted to facilitate the collapse without triggering a die-hard reaction from hardline Soviet officials. In effect, our policy was, “don’t kick dirt on someone holding a loaded machine gun.” As a part of that policy, the US and NATO promised not to take advantage of Russia’s dire crisis by expanding NATO and US forces into Eastern Europe.
We made our commitments. The Russians fell into line. Common sense prevailed. The Soviet empire fell more or less peacefully. The possibility of nuclear war was avoided—a good day’s work all around.
Now, a generation later, the question arises: did we promise not to expand NATO and US military power into Eastern Europe? And if we did, what was the impact of breaking those promises?
The evidence strongly suggests that the US and NATO promised not to expand NATO. These were not full-fledged treaty obligations, but repeated commitments made by our leaders to high Russian officials. Our current leadership disregards our promises, but the facts are real enough. And facts have consequences.
In 1990, Secretary of State Jim Baker speaking for the US government, promised Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union that the US and NATO would move “not one inch eastward.”
Baker went on to declare: “NATO expansion is unacceptable not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” So said our secretary of state.
In March 1991, British Prime Minister John Major assured Gorbachev, “We are not talking about the strengthening of NATO.” At the same meeting, Russian Marshal Dmitri Yazov asked about the interest of East European leaders in NATO membership. Major responded, “Nothing of the sort will happen.”
A few months later, in July 1991, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner told Russian officials that “the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 of 16 NATO members support this point of view).”
How did the Russians interpret these, and other similar commitments made by other Western leaders? They bought it. Boris Yeltsin, the first Russian president, later summed it up: "the spirit of the treaty on the final settlement...precludes the option of expanding the NATO zone into the East."
Promises Forgotten or Ignored
The Soviet Union passed into history peacefully, partly because of our verbal commitments not to expand NATO into Russia’s backyard. With the passage of time, these and similar promises have been conveniently forgotten…
In the early 2000s, despite its previous commitments, NATO expanded into Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. Most of Eastern Europe joined NATO. And although this may have made the new members sigh with relief, the Russians were not happy.
By 2010, NATO planned on admitting Georgia and Ukraine in defiance of earlier promises. In effect, we said, “the situation has changed, and we never promised anything of the sort anyway.” We made it clear that we would support eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO. NATO officials declared, “these countries will become members of NATO.”
Warning Signs
Russia gradually recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps Russian leaders (Putin et al.) inevitably fell under the spell of centuries-old attitudes towards its East European neighbors, particularly Ukraine. For the Russians, Ukraine was a former subject and a rival.
The breakup of the Soviet Union had resulted in a patchwork of uncertain borders, mixed ethnic populations, and friction in Crimea, Donbas, and elsewhere. And Russians viewed these concerns through the lens of their traditional fear of domination by other countries. Putin’s personal ambitions and political goals both reflect and amplify Russian fears.
Since the thirteenth Century, Russia has been invaded by Mongols, Tatars, Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, Swedes, and Turks. Even the US invaded Russia (Siberia) during the Russian Civil War (1918). Germany invaded Russia in 1914 and 1941. Russia’s historical response to these invasions was defensive, mixed with plenty of aggression and conquest of its neighbors. This may not seem important to Americans, but it is to Russians.
So, it is hardly surprising that Putin’s Russia reacted aggressively. This is especially true about the expansion of NATO, which Soviet and post-Soviet leaders considered a threat.
In 2008 Putin, responding to the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO, told U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns:
“No Russian leader could stand idly by in the face of steps toward NATO membership for Ukraine. That would be a hostile act toward Russia,”
In the circuitous language of diplomacy, a “hostile act” is generally interpreted as a cause for war or military action.
Today, American officials split hairs and insist that no promises were made to Russia. But that’s double-talk and self-serving. Admitting our earlier commitments would undermine the assumed legitimacy of our support for Ukraine and our reckless push for regime change in Russia.
Escalation
So now, in our determination to do the “right” thing, we are escalating the conflict. We are giving Ukraine ever more significant numbers of advanced weapons with the passing of every month. On January 25th, the US and Germany agreed to provide Ukraine with advanced M-1 and Leopard 2 tanks. Tanks are primarily offensive weapons, not defensive, as the Biden administration claims.
Advanced fighter-Bombers will be next. President Zelensky wants US-made F-16s to defend his cities from air attacks. But the F-16 is a fighter bomber, a fundamentally offensive weapon.
On January 26th, the German foreign minister openly admitted, “We are fighting a war against Russia.” A few hours later, she tried to take it back, but her first statement was honest; the take back was a political coverup.
Meanwhile, the Biden Administration is encouraging Ukraine to attack and occupy Crimea, an area with a complex history. Russia took it from the Ottoman Turks in 1783. Later it was a part of the Soviet Union. Briefly, it belonged to Ukraine. Then it was absorbed/seized by Russia. Reconquest by Ukraine would probably not be popular with many Crimeans, whose ethnic composition is Russian (65%), Ukrainian (15%), and Crimean Tatars (12.0%).
War to the Nuclear Hilt
Regardless of battlefield events, Ukraine’s war is no longer defensive. The US and NATO are seeking regime change. We are committed to Russia’s total defeat. Ok, fine, say some people, Putin deserves it. But what are the implications?
Russia’s defeat and regime change could plunge it into a civil war or chaos. What happens to Russia’s 6,000 nuclear weapons in that case? What would happen to their possible illegal stock of bioweapons? Do we want weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of Iran, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, or Russia’s neighbors?
What would the unpredictable Putin do if he faced the loss of Crimea, which he considers his crowning political achievement? Does it make sense to corner an allegedly “crazy” man—sitting on a pile of nukes—with complete defeat? In March, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Putin. The fate of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic, who died in an EU prison, is probably a disincentive for Putin to end the war. When a rat is cornered, it attacks. In this case, however, the rat has nuclear weapons.
And Putin can see he may be trapped. There is a lot at stake for everybody, especially him. The US and NATO have virtually declared war on Russia, turning a regional conflict into a new form of world war by proxy. He is fighting for his life. Perhaps we are too.
Biden, his supporters, Neocons, and RINOs argue Putin wouldn’t dare use tactical nukes against Ukraine to save his own skin. Are they sure? Biden foolishly appears to have extended America’s “nuclear umbrella” over Ukraine. He has hinted that we would retaliate in kind if Russia used nukes in Ukraine.
What if Russia uses tactical nukes against Ukraine? Do we retaliate with nukes against Russian forces on Russian soil? Would the Russians then retaliate against NATO air bases? Or the US itself?
How would the Russians react if they saw a significant incoming strike against nuclear targets in their country? Might they not launch a counterstrike before their missiles are destroyed on the ground? This is a classic Cold War nuclear scenario: a small war leads to an all-out nuclear exchange. Everybody loses. Millions die.
Supporters of the Ukraine war answer these potentialities with bluster and demands for revenge. “Don’t worry; they don’t have the guts.” Or “we’ll show them,” as if the possible use of nuclear weapons is like a Euro soccer playoff or the Super Bowl without a halftime show.
End it!
The only rational solution, the safest course, is negotiation, not more offensive weapons for Ukraine and an ever-expanding war. If the US and Russia were able to negotiate a peaceful solution to the collapse of the Soviet Union, why not the Ukraine War?
We should not allow a stubborn president determined to have his way, ruin our lives, or kill us. Who am I talking about? Three stubborn men: Putin, Biden, and Zelensky. This could be the start of the war we have dreaded since 1945. Let’s not let their ambition, pride, ignorance, and hunger for revenge plunge the world into the nuclear abyss.
Time to negotiate.
Quote Sources:
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/NATO-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-NATO-has-become-flash-point-russia-ukraine